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Abstract—The ever growing demands of embedded systems to
satisfy high computing performance and cost efficiency lead to the
trend of using commercial off-the-shelf hardware. However, due
to their highly integrated design they are becoming increasingly
susceptible to hardware errors (e.g. caused by radiation-induced
soft-errors or wear-out effects). Since such faults cannot be
fully prevented, systems have to cope with their effects. At
the same time there is the trend of multi-core processors in
embedded systems. Approaches to achieve fault tolerance by using
the multiple cores to establish redundancy have been presented
in literature. However, typically only homogeneous redundancy
techniques are considered to tolerate soft errors. However, there
is a lack of appropriate reaction mechanisms for restoring the
system in case of permanent hardware faults.
Here, we propose the basic idea of enhancing multi-core re-
dundancy techniques with a cost-efficient automated introduction
of diversity in the executed software replicas. Recently, these
automated software diversity techniques have attracted attention
in the security domain. We propose to use these techniques to
recover from permanent hardware faults. This is achieved by
adapting the software execution in such a way that permanent
faults are mitigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) play a central role in many
critical application domains such as industrial control, au-
tomotive, and healthcare. Consequently, the reliability and
availability of these systems has become a significant con-
cern. At the same time cyber-physical systems are facing
increasing demands on high computing performance (e.g., for
autonomous driving). This leads to a move to commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware allowing designers to use state-
of-the-art components that guarantee a high performance [1].
However, the vulnerability to hardware faults increases due
to the continuing structure downscaling of the semiconductor
industry. Thus, soft errors due to radiation and permanent
errors due to manufacturing, process variations, ageing, etc.
are expected to occur more often in future [2].
Established solutions to provide the required reliability
are based on hardened components. However, such hardware-
based approaches are very costly. Furthermore, commercially-
available processors that are especially designed and man-
ufactured for safety-critical applications typically only offer
limited computing performance features. Therefore, software-
based approaches for error detection and correction are be-
coming increasingly important. Furthermore, with the advent
of mult-core technology, hardware redundancy techniques,
which typically impose very high hardware overheads, are
becoming ever more attractive [3]. For example, a Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) mechanism can be implemented
by triplicating a critical task on three cores and comparing the
results.
Although much research in recent years has focused on en-
hancing the reliability of multi-core systems with redundancy,
they typically only consider homogeneous redundancy (e.g.
[1], [3], [4]). This means that the same binary is replicated
on the redundant cores. Considering a TMR system, this
allows to detect transient and permanent faults in one core.
Furthermore, permanent faults in one core can be masked,
since the remaining two cores produce the correct result.
Typical solutions for many core systems (e.g. highly parallel
processors) involve deactivating the faulty core and shifting the
calculation to a spare core [1]. Due to the limited resources
of embedded systems (i.e. power, production costs) they are
composed of multi-core processors with a low number of cores
(i.e. less than eight cores). Consequently, few spare cores are
available, which limits the means of these fail-over concepts.
Thus, in order to increase the availability, it is desired to
recover from an identified permanent malfunctioning of a core.
Here, we present a software-based approach of establishing
heterogeneous redundancy on a multi-core platform. We pro-
pose to push multi-core redundancy techniques towards the
next level by introducing diversity in the redundant executions
in a cost-efficient way. The main idea is to exploit concepts
of research on automated software diversity that has mainly
been published in the security domain to increase the fault
recovery capabilities of redundancy implemented on a multi-
core system. We suggest a high-level concept of using capa-
bilities of these techniques to dynamically change the diversity
in execution to recover from detected faulty states. The main
idea is to adapt the execution of the diverse program replicas
in such a way that a permanent hardware fault is bypassed.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Self-Healing Systems
In order to deal with unforeseen events the idea of soft-
ware self-adaptability has received attention [5]. For example,
self-healing systems autonomously detect and recover from
faulty states by changing their configuration. However, so far
these techniques are mainly used in complex server systems.
Methods for embedded systems to recover from an unhealthy
state are still a research challenge. Although hardware faults
can be bypassed with self-modifying hardware (e.g. [6]), this
technique is not applicable for typical COTS hardware and
only offers limited flexibility. Thus, there remains the need
for sophisticated software-based methods to handle unforeseen
scenarios caused by faults.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
03
52
8v
2 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
1 N
ov
 20
15
B. Fault Tolerance via Multi-Core Redundancy
The current development trend for computing platforms
has moved from increasing the frequency of single cores to
increasing the parallelism with multiple cores on the same
die [7]. Although, multi-core technologies present new de-
velopment challenges, they have strong potential to support
a cost-efficient creation of fault tolerance. Several online error
detection techniques for multi-core processor components have
been proposed. According to [3] these techniques can be
classified in periodic built-in self-test, dynamic verification,
anomaly detection and redundant execution approaches. Here,
we only focus on the latter and use built-in self-tests as a
supplementary technique.
N-modular redundancy is a widely-used fault detection
technique where multiple processing elements process the
same data. A well-known example is Dual Modular Redun-
dancy (DMR) using two elements. Consequently, an error
is detected, if the results of the two elements are different.
Another prominent technique is Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR) that can also identify one faulty element with majority
voting. This leads to a higher availability, since the system
can continue the execution by masking the faulty element
[8]. Since the voter is a single point of failure, it has to be
highly reliable. Furthermore, these techniques can be clas-
sified in spatial and temporal redundancy techniques. While
spatial redundancy means that the calculation is performed on
distinct hardware components, temporal redundancy indicates
that the same calculation is performed multiple times one after
the other. Typically, redundancy established on a multi-core
realizes spatial redundancy exploiting the inherent replication
of processor cores. The cost-efficient achievement of hardware
redundancy on a multi-core system is supported by the fact that
the full utilization of cores is usually not feasible and, therefore
unused processor cores can be used to execute redundant
threads.
The two main hardware-based approaches of redundant
execution that have been proposed in literature are the lockstep
configuration and the redundant multithreading (RMT) with
and without loose lockstepping [3]. In typical lockstep ap-
proaches identical cores are tightly-coupled and cross-checks
are performed at each cycle or instruction execution.
Compared to hardware-based redundancy techniques,
software-based approaches provide a low-cost alternative,
since they impose a smaller hardware overhead and offer a
higher level of flexibility. Several approaches of how to realize
software-based redundancy on a multi-core system have been
proposed. The authors of [9] propose the replication of a
task on three cores and to execute the comparison on a core
that offers a high reliability. In [4] Romain - an OS service
providing an adaptively replicated execution - is presented.
Related work considers to adapt the number of parallel
redundant executions during runtime [4], [1]. We propose to
further increase the adaptability by also adapting the way of
how the software is executed. Most of the presented approaches
use homogeneous redundancy to detect hardware faults during
operation. However, if both variants are identical and include
the same systematic fault, they fail in the same way and the
fault is not detected. Thus, the reliability of a redundant system
not only depends on the reliability of each version, but also
on the dissimilarity between them. There have been proposals
to use the diversity of a heterogenous multi-core architecture
to increase the fault tolerance [10]. However, these approaches
only offer limited portability. Thus, we propose to realize the
diversity not in hardware, but in software. In [3] the idea
of using diverse software-component replicas in a multi-core
environment is presented. Here, we describe how to generate
the diverse software replicas in an automated way.
C. Automated Software Diversity
Automated software diversity (ASD) techniques introduce
diversity in the execution of the program. Recently, automated
diversity gained attention in the security domain as a technique
of diversifying each deployed program version [11]. This
forces attackers to target each system individually. In contrast
to N-version programming [12], the diversity is introduced
without manual interactions of humans in the loop. A common
approach to realize such an automated software diversification
is randomization to create ”diversity in execution”. This ”diver-
sity in execution” can denote diverse timings, diverse outputs,
diverse memory usages etc. In contrast to static techniques that
generate multiple diverse program versions, dynamic software
diversity techniques use only one binary that is deployed and
introduces the diversity during operation. More details about
automated software diversity research is provided in [13], [14].
1) Dynamic Software Diversity: Dynamic randomization
methods create only one single version of an executable
program that is able to perform its executions differently. These
techniques either adapt the interfaces or the implementation
[24]. Interface adaptions work on top of the code that is
protected. They modify the layout or the interfaces, without
changing the implementation of the core code that uses the
interfaces. Implementation diversifications, do not alter the
interface, but the implementations of portions of the code
to make it resistant. Several approaches make programs self-
randomizing by instrumenting them to mutate one or more
implementation aspects as the program is loaded by the oper-
ating system or as it runs [11].
Dynamic automated software diversity is often realized by
the operating system without the need to change the user pro-
gram itself. However, appropriate mechanisms could also be
built in the program as shown in I. Table II presents examples
of dynamic ASD techniques presented in literature. Most of
the techniques have been researched for security purposes.
However, we assume that adaptations of these approaches may
also be used to reach reliability goals. Dynamic reconfiguration
could be applied in such a way that self-healing is established
by bypassing detected faults. A well-established method that
follows that principle is data re-expression. It transforms the
original input to produce new inputs to redundant variants [18].
After execution the distortion introduced by the re-expression
is removed before comparison. So a given initial data within
the program failure region can be re-expressed to an input data
that circumvents the faulty region [12].
2) Static Software Diversity: Static software diversity tech-
niques automatically generate multiple diverse program vari-
ants based on the same source code before distributing the
program. The two main approaches are to perform program
transformation, where a diversified source code version is gen-
erated, or to introduce diversity during the compilation/linking
TABLE I. EXAMPLES OF ADJUSTABLE PARAMETERS OF DYNAMIC
SOFTWARE DIVERSITY METHODS
Randomization method Parameter
Memory gaps between objects [15] Gap size
Changing base address of program [15] Base address
Changing base address of libraries and
stack [16]
Base address
Permutation of the order of routine calls
variables [15]
Order of calls
Permutation of the order of variables [15] Order of variables
Insertion of NOP instructions [17] Number of NOPs
Data re-expression / data diversity
(in=f(in,k), out = f−1(out,k)) [18]
Parameter in
re-expression
algorithm (k)
TABLE II. EXAMPLES OF DYNAMIC AUTOMATED DIVERSITY
TECHNIQUES AND THE GOALS FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN PROPOSED IN
LITERATURE.
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Data randomization [18] x x x
Memory layout
randomization (e.g. [15],
[16])
x x x x
Program encoding
randomization (e.g. [19])
x x x
In-place diversification
(e.g. [20])
x x x
Instruction location
randomization (e.g. [21],
[22]
x x x
Binary stirring [23] x x x
stage. There are two main approaches. First, diversity could be
introduced by performing code transformations meaning that
based on a common source code basis diverse source code
variants are generated. Second, the diversification could be
done during compiling/linking by using one source code basis
to generate diverse binaries.
Additionally, it can be seen, that some techniques have been
proposed in the security domain as well as in the reliability
domain. This indicates the high potential cross-fertilization of
these techniques. For example, a simple way of automatically
introducing diversity in execution is to use different compilers
and compiler options to generate multiple program versions. It
has been shown that diverse compiling not only enhances the
security of systems [25] but it can also increase the hardware
and software fault tolerance [26], [27], [28].
However, there are also many examples of static ASD
techniques that have only been investigated to fulfill either
security or reliability goals. Most techniques targeting the
security are used to diversify a software program before
deploying it on different targets [11]. However, we expect
that the basic concepts of these techniques also have a high
potential of increasing the overall resilience (e.g. hardware-
fault tolerance) in a redundant configuration on a multi-core
system.
We propose to execute diverse replicas on a multi-core
system to recover from detected faults. The above described
techniques represent possible methods that can be applied
to create these diverse replicas. These techniques introduce
diversity in execution, which means that diverse software
executions will show different timing characteristics and/or
use different memory cells or processor instructions. The goal
of diversification methods for fault recovery is that the faulty
region is bypassed from the adapted execution.
III. FAULT RECOVERY APPROACH
A. System Model
The target applications for our techniques are cyber-
physical systems, where an embedded device is used to per-
form some control application. Such devices typically operate
by performing an input acquisition to process data coming
from sensors. Then, these input data is processed and the
output is propagated to physical actuators. Here, we focus on
how to increase the reliability of the processing task.
The considered embedded device consists of a multi-core
processor. We assume that software-based mechanisms to
manage a redundant calculation of important tasks is already in
place (e.g. as described in [1], [29], [30]). Thus, tasks with high
reliability requirements are executed redundantly on multiple
cores. After all calculations finished, a separate core executes
an acceptance test comparing the results of the redundant
calculations with a majority voter. Since this voting involves
a single point of failure, it has to be protected. Techniques
to achieve this have been proposed in previous work. For
example, in [1] it is proposed to use software-based self-tests
to ensure that the needed components to execute the voting
procedure are function successfully at certain checkpoints. In
the fault free case, the overhead of such tests is relatively
low, since only those components that are used by the voting
mechanism have to be checked.
We assume a N-modular redundant system, meaning that N
identical modules are synchronized in order to perform voting
of the outputs. The voting scheme is implemented as a basic
M-out-of-N majority voting. Thus, dN/2e is the minimum
number of modules free from error that are required to get
a majority count. Thus, the technique allows at most N-M
cores to fail. Additionally, we assume that all modules fail
independently. For the sake of simplicity, we use a TMR
system with a 2oo3 majority voting as an example in the
remaining paper. Such a TMR system can tolerate faults in
one core and the faulty core is identified.
Furthermore, we are considering embedded devices that
are connected to a network offering the possibility to perform
remote updates. A remote server can be used to update the
binaries that are executed on the embedded device. We assume
that the trustworthiness of the remote server is guaranteed (e.g.
with methods as exemplified in [31]).
B. Fault Model
The scenario we address is the occurrence of a permanent
fault in one of the cores executing a redundant calculation
Core 2
Core 1 Core 2
Core 3 Core 4
Voter Redundant
Calculation
Redundant
Calculation
Redundant
Calculation
COTS Multicore
CPU
L1 Cache
Register
ALU
Instruction 
decoder
- Register cell faults
- Instruction 
  decoder faults
- Memory cell faults
   (wrong content of memory cell
     due to fault in bus or cache)
- Address decoding fault   
(wrong cell is addressed due to 
fault in bus or cache)
Fig. 1. System overview and considered fault types.
Program 
Execution (P)
Inputs
Decision 
Mechanism 
(DM)
Program outputs 
or alarm signal
Randomization 
Paramters
Error 
information
Diversification 
Control (D)
Fig. 2. Basic structure of AASD. Based on information of a monitoring
component (DM), a diversification controller decides whether and how to
reconfigure the randomization mechanism of the main program [33].
as shown in Fig. 1. We consider fault sources of CPU-
core elements as recommended by the IEC 61508 safety
standard [32]: registers, internal cache, instruction decoding,
and address calculation/transfer.
C. Adaptive Automated Software Diversity Concept Overview
To implement fault recovery, we propose to use the well-
known concept of recovery blocks [12]. The main idea of
recovery blocks is to execute alternate versions of a function, if
the primary alternative of the function does not pass the accep-
tance test. Our approach extends this concept by generating the
diverse replicas of the program automatically during runtime.
This could be established by switching the statically generated
program version or by changing the dynamic randomization.
Fig. 2 shows the basic principle of an adaptive automated
software diversity (AASD) system [33]. Typically, a fault
tolerant system contains the program, which performs the
intended functionality of the system and a decision mecha-
nism (DM) that monitors the program execution [12]. The
DM detects anomalies, indicates alarms and decides which
outputs to forward. In our application, the voter implements
the DM. Additionally, we propose to add a component denoted
as diversification control that creates a feedback-loop. This
component manages the AASD by collecting and analyzing
data on detected anomalies obtained from the DM. We propose
to design the program in such a way that it can be randomized
during execution according to parameters that can be adjusted
during runtime (see Table I).
Then, the diversification control can decide to alter the
execution by changing one or multiple parameters of the ASD
configuration. More specifically, we propose to learn from
detected anomalies and to adapt the software of the replica
that has been identified to be problematic by diversifying the
execution with the above described ASD methods.
Identified faulty core i
Adapt dynamic diversity 
mechanisms of core i
Increase error_counteri
error_counteri < thresholddynamic
yes
Program execution with 
new randomization 
parameters
Execute SBSTs
Hardware fault found?no
Migrate to spare core or
 return failure exception
Send hardware fault description 
to remote server
yes
Binary generation
Send new binary to 
CPS device 
Binary generation sucessful?
Send failure information to 
CPS device
Program execution with 
new binary
no
yes
no
CPS device
Server
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Fig. 3. Basic procedure of fault recovery on a redundant multi-core system.
The tasks colored in green are correspond to the decision mechanism, orange
tasks are executed by the diversification control of Fig. 2.
D. Fault Recovery Procedure
In Fig. 3 an overview of the proposed fault recovery
procedure is shown. If the voter detects a mismatch of the
output values of the executions on the redundant core (1) an
error counter corresponding to the faulty core is increased (2) .
If subsequent executions of this core are performed correctly,
it is assumed that the observed error has been caused by a
transient fault and the error counter is set to zero. However,
if more than a certain number of errors (thresholddynamic)
have been observed, the core is regarded to be faulty and fault
recovery approaches are applied (3).
First, we try to adapt the execution with adaptive dynamic
diversity methods (4)(5). Namely, the trend of the observed
anomalies and the applied adjustable parameter settings of
the dynamic diversity features are analyzed. Then, the dy-
namic diversity parameters are adjusted accordingly. In [34],
we presented a basic example of how to implement such a
mechanism. We assessed the method of introducing memory
gaps with adjustable size. By changing this size during runtime
the starting address of used variables can be changed. The size
of the memory gaps represents the reconfiguration parameter
that can be changed by the diversification control. Thus, if
the diversification control decides to change a replica, the size
of the memory gaps is adapted. Preliminary results indicate
that this technique is effective in circumventing faulty memory
regions. For example, for a simple bitcount application, the
approach was able to bypass 94% of introduced address
decoder faults that would not have been masked without
these mechanism. Table III shows possible dynamic diversity
techniques and the fault types, which we expect that could be
tolerated.
If the adaptive dynamic diversity approach does not im-
prove the fault tolerance, we try to recover from the fault with
static diversity mechanisms. Therefore, first software-based
self-tests are applied to identify the fault (6). We propose to
also use software-based self-tests finding the considered fault
types as described in the IEC 61508 safety standard. If the tests
identify a fault, the fault definition (fault location, type of fault)
is sent to a remote server (8). For example, these fault could
be register bit with a value that cannot be changed (i.e. stuck-
at-0 or stuck-at-1 faults). If no fault can be found, the fault
recovery procedure is stopped and further fault handling can
be applied (7). For example, the calculation can be mapped
TABLE III. EXPECTED FAULT TYPES THAT CAN BE ADDRESSED WITH
EXAMPLE CANDIDATES OF DYNAMIC DIVERSITY TECHNIQUES
Register
cell
fault
Instruction
decoder
fault
Memory
cell
fault
Address
decod-
ing
fault
Memory gaps [15] x x
Changing base addresses [15] x x
Data randomization [18] x x
Memory layout randomization
(e.g. [15], [16])
x x
Program encoding
randomization (e.g. [19])
x
to a spare core, or an alarm is forwarded. Having the fault
information and the source code, a powerful remote server
tries to generate a variant of the software that bypasses the
fault by using static diversity techniques (9). Details of this
generation are described below. If the generation is successful,
the embedded device receives the new binary and uses this
binary for the execution on the faulty core (10).
E. Remote Binary Generation with Static Diversity Methods
Fig. 4 illustrates the binary generation procedure on the
remote server. To generate diverse executions of the same
source code static diversification methods are applied. Such
methods could include source code mutations and using the
compiler in such a way that the execution is diversified. As
shown in [28], the usage of diverse optimization flags during
the compilation stage influences the amount of masked register
and instruction decoder faults. We propose to exploit and
leverage such effects in order to generate a binary that bypasses
a given fault. For example, the GCC compiler allows to specify
a register that should not be used (-ffixed-reg). If faults a
certain register is faulty, this flag can be exploited to generate
a binary that does not use this register. We propose to have
multiple static diversity techniques in place. Then, different
combinations of these diversity techniques can be applied to
generate binaries. If a binary has been generated that masks
the given fault with a certain probability (masking coverage)
the binary generation procedure was successful and the binary
is sent to the embedded device.
We propose the following procedure to determine the
probability that a given fault type is masked. To evaluate
the consequences of a fault (i.e. fault masking, crash, or
corrupted data) we propose to apply fault simulation with ap-
propriate fault injection techniques. We use the QEMU-based
fault injection framework as described in [35], [36][35], [36].
This framework supports widely-deployed commercial off-the-
shelf processor architectures and allows a software-based fault
simulation without the need for software instrumentation. The
framework features the injection of memory cell faults, address
decoder faults, instruction decoder faults and register faults.
Additionally, a input test set that represents typical input values
is needed. Then, the processing of these input stimuli on a
faulty hardware is simulated and the output is compared with
a given golden reference output that would be generated on
a correct hardware. We assume that the probability that the
injected fault is masked can be approximated by the proportion
Source 
Code
Try next static 
randomization variant
0101
1111
1000
Binary
Fault simulation
Input test set
Fault description
Masking Coverage > 
Threshold ?
Binary generation 
successful
Binary generation NOT 
successful
More randomization 
variants available?
yes
yes no
no
Fig. 4. Basic procedure of binary generation on a remote server. Static
diversity techniques are applied in order to get a binary that masks the given
fault with a given probability (masking coverage). The figure shows details of
the step (9) shown in Fig. 3.
of runs where the fault is masked and the total amount of tested
input stimuli.
IV. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Although, there is a high fault recovery potential of the
proposed technique, it poses many research challenges.
a) Determinism: Many dependable applications have
fulfill real time requirements and thus require a deterministic
execution. Here, the introduction of diversity would compli-
cate the difficult enough task of determining the worst case
execution time.
b) Implementation overhead: The impact on the fault
detection latency and the resource requirements (e.g. perfor-
mance, memory) should be kept low.
c) Finding appropriate ASD techniques: We have pre-
sented potential ASD techniques above. However, studies are
required to investigate in the feasibility of the approaches
in a multi-core system. Furthermore, exhaustive evaluations
on the effectiveness of the fault detection capabilities of the
techniques for different kind of applications are required.
d) Adaptation tactics: Tactics of how to analyze the
trends of detection malfunctions and ways of adapting the
execution on redundant replicas have to be investigated.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a significant increase in complexity that threatens
the system reliability. Complex embedded systems have to
cope with an increasing number of hardware faults. Here,
we proposed to use the opportunities inherent multi-core
redundancy to achieve resilience. While typical research in this
field only focuses on an homogeneous redundant execution,
we propose to introduce diversity in the executed software
versions.
To keep the development overhead low and offer means to
adapt the executions during runtime, we proposed to use auto-
mated software diversity approaches. Although, many promis-
ing approaches have been presented in literature, they have
not been considered in the context of a redundant multi-core
system so far. Thus, we tried to emphasize cross-fertilization
of security, reliability, and multi-core research. We highlighted
the idea of using automated software diversity techniques for
fault recovery.
In the future, we plan to evaluate adaptive automated soft-
ware diversity techniques for specific complex applications in a
multi-core system by implementing a prototype. Furthermore,
we hope to encourage further researchers to explore techniques
based on this promising yet challenging idea.
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